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The "trimester framework" of Roe v. Wade permitted states to
enact different categories of abortion regulations at different stages
of pregnancy.1 "For the stage prior to approximately the end of the
first trimester," Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court, "the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment
of the pregnant woman's attending physician."2 In the second
trimester, the state could adopt abortion restrictions "reasonably
related to maternal health." After fetal "viability"-the point when
the fetus could survive outside the womb, then associated with the
third trimester 4-a state's interest in "the potentiality of human
life" would support prohibition of abortion, so long as the law
allowed exceptions for the life or health of the mother.' This
trimester framework derived from the Court's assessment of when
in pregnancy each of the two recognized state interests-preserving
maternal health and protecting fetal life-became "compelling." 6
* Justice Thomas 0. Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law, University of
Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank John Little, Isaac McAdams and Jason
Sheppard for excellent research assistance. I am also grateful to David Garrow and
Clarke Forsythe for helpful comments on a draft of the article. The errors that
remain are my responsibility.
' Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 249, 249
(2009).
2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
1 Id.
4 Id. at 160 (defining "viable" to mean "potentially able to live outside the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid"); Beck, supra note 1, at 250 (viability
associated with third trimester at time of Roe).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
6 Id. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the
health of the mother, the 'compelling' point, in the light of present medical knowl-
edge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester."); id. ("With respect to the
State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is
at viability.").
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The Court's subsequent decision in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey diminished the doctrinal significance
of Roe's trimester analysis. 7 The controlling plurality opinion of Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter "abandonled) the trimester
framework as a rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed
at the protection of fetal life."8 The plurality did retain one element
of the trimester framework-the rule that a state could not forbid
abortion prior to fetal viability'-but previability regulations were
now reviewed under a less rigorous standard, subject to invalidation
only if they created an "undue burden" on the right to terminate a
pregnancy.10 Casey thus discarded the trimester framework, apart
from the viability rule, and diminished the level of scrutiny applied
to previability regulations.
One of the many controversies generated by Roe has concerned
which portions of Justice Blackmun's opinion should be treated as
expressing the holding of the case. The Roe opinion itself used the
term "holding" in a passage referring to the entire trimester frame-
work: "This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative weights
of the respective interests involved, with the lessons and examples
of medical and legal history, with the lenity of the common law,
and with the demands of the profound problems of the present
day."" It is not clear whether the Court meant the term "holding"
here to be understood in the technical sense of "[a] court's deter-
mination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision," 1 2 or was
employing the word more informally. 3 If the opinion did mean to
7 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ.).
8 Id.
Id. at 879 ("a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy before viability").
'o Id. at 876-77.
"Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added); see Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1078-79 (2005).
12 See Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article
III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994) ("The term dicta typically refers to state-
ments in a judicial opinion that are not necessary to support the decision reached
by the court. A dictum is usually contrasted with a holding, a term used to refer to
a rule or principle that decides the case.").
13 The Court may have used the word "holding" in a looser sense as a synonym
for "decision." The next two sentences of the opinion, which seem to follow a
parallel structure, use the word "decision" in place of the word "holding" in this
sentence. Id. at 165-66 ("This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative
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use the term "holding" in its technical sense, then we shall see that
the usage was plainly incorrect and inconsistent with what Justice
Blackmun was telling other Justices in the Court's internal corre-
spondence about the case.
In two later opinions, Justices critical of the trimester framework
offered narrower interpretations of Roe's holding that would
exclude part or all of the Court's trimester analysis. In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a
plurality opinion criticizing the trimester framework.' 4 Joined by Jus-
tices White and Kennedy, Rehnquist rejected the trimester-based
analysis, but found no reason to revisit "the holding of Roe, which
was that the Texas statute unconstitutionally infringed the right to
an abortion derived from the Due Process Clause." 15 In narrowly
describing Roe's holding, the plurality implicitly treated the entire
trimester framework-including the viability rule-as dicta, unnec-
essary to the original decision. Three terms later, the Casey plurality
took a somewhat broader view of Roe's "essential holding," reading
it to encompass the viability rule, and not simply the invalidity of
the Texas statute under a due process right to abortion. 6
Identification of Roe's holding is significant, not just because of
the different versions identified in various Supreme Court opinions,
weights of the respective interests involved, with the lessons and examples of medi-
cal and legal history, with the lenity of the common law, and with the demands of
the profound problems of the present day. The decision leaves the State free to
place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so
long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests. The decision
vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to
his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests provide
compelling justifications for intervention.") (emphasis added).
14492 U.S. 490, 517-19 (1989) (plurality opinion).
1- Id. at 521.
16 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (Roe's holding included "a recognition of the right of
the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without
undue interference from the State") (emphasis added). Academic commentary
has also focused on the distinction between Roe's holding and its dicta. See
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 11, at 1078-84 (discussing which statements in
Roe should be classified as parts of holding); Dorf, supra note 12, at 2032-33
("Surely, the Chief Justice's distinction [in Webster] between the holding and dic-
tum of Roe overextended the principle that a federal court should not announce
a rule broader than necessary to decide the case before it. For the law to consist
of more than an arbitrary collection of facts and outcomes, judges must be per-
mitted to distinguish between what they deem relevant and what they deem
irrelevant.").
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but also as one facet of the larger debate about whether the Roe
Court should have drafted a less ambitious opinion. Prior to joining
the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg gave a famous address
arguing that "[a] less encompassing Roe, one that merely struck
down the extreme Texas law and went no further on that day, I
believe... might have served to reduce rather than to fuel contro-
versy." 11 Justice Ginsburg's argument assumes that the Court could
have written a narrower opinion that reached the same outcome,
i.e., that portions of the Roe opinion were unnecessary to resolution
of the issues before the Court.
Access to the papers of several Justices on the Roe Court has
opened a window on the internal deliberations in the case.18 Those
papers speak to the issue of Roe's holding and offer support for
Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Webster. At least four Justices
in the Roe majority, including the author of the opinion, stated
that the Court did not need to resolve the line-drawing questions
addressed in the trimester analysis or used the label "dicta" when
referring to draft opinions discussing the duration of abortion rights.
Since some of the relevant memoranda were circulated to the entire
Court, the Webster plurality's distinction between Roe's holding and
dicta may have reflected the recollections of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice White, who both participated in the original delibera-
tions in the case. 19
Professor David J. Garrow has previously examined internal doc-
uments from Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 20 telling a
fascinating story about the evolution of the ultimate opinions and
revealing some of the "roads not taken" that could have propelled
our constitutional history in significantly different directions.21 Our
17 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185,
1199 (1992); see also id. at 1208 ("Roe... halted a political process that was mov-
ing in a reform direction and thereby, I believe, prolonged divisiveness and deferred
stable settlement of the issue.").
11 See David J. Garrow, LIBERTY AND SEXUALiTY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF
ROE V. WADE (1994); David J. Garrow, Revelations on the Road to Roe, AMERICAN
LAWYER, Vol. 22, pp. 80-83 (May 2000) (reporting new revelations derived from
the papers of Justice Powell); David J. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, LEGAL
AFFAIRS, pp. 26-34 (May/June 2005).
'9 Roe, 410 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
20 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
21 See supra note 18.
HeinOnline  -- 51 Am. J. Legal Hist. 508 2011
review of the Roe deliberations will take us through some of the
same documents discussed by Professor Garrow, but with a nar-
rower, more precise focus. Our goal will be to highlight aspects of
the internal Roe deliberations relevant to the holding versus dicta
controversy and the genesis of the trimester framework that con-
tinues to leave curious traces in our law. 22 The review will show that
Justices who joined Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe were self-con-
sciously creating dicta, in part because they wanted to assist legis-
lators who would revise state abortion laws in the wake of the
decision.
ISSUES LITIGATED IN ROE V. WADE
The Roe v. Wade litigation began in a three-judge district court
in Texas. 23 The plaintiffs included "Jane Roe," an unmarried pregnant
woman, who presented the only claim eventually addressed on the
merits by the Supreme Court. 4 The suit challenged several provi-
sions of the Texas Penal Code, including a general prohibition on
abortions:
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly
procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall
use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or internally
applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the peni-
22 See, e.g., Beck, supra note 1, at 257-67 (noting strange consequences of the
viability rule and comparing it to the law of other countries).
23 See Roe v. Wade, 314 F Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24 Roe sued "on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated." Id. at 1219
n.1 & 1220. The Supreme Court concluded that "wholly apart from the class as-
pects" Roe had standing to challenge the Texas statute and that, notwithstanding
the conclusion of her pregnancy, this was an appropriate instance for applying an
exception to the mootness doctrine for cases "capable of repetition, yet evading
review." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973) (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). A doctor who intervened after suit was filed
was found to have standing in the district court. 314 F. Supp. at 1219 n.1 & 1220.
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the doctor's claims should have been dis-
missed because he was subject to pending criminal prosecutions in state court.
Roe, at 126-27 & n.7. There was also a married couple (the "Does") who sued on
behalf of a class in the district court, but the wife did not claim to be pregnant.
314 F. Supp. at 1219 n.1 & 1220. The Supreme Court concluded that the Does'
injuries were too speculative or otherwise insufficient to demonstrate a case or
controversy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 127-29.
HeinOnline  -- 51 Am. J. Legal Hist. 509 2011
tentiary not less than two nor more than five years; if it be done without
her consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By "abortion" is meant that
the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or
that a premature birth thereof be caused.2"
A separate provision exempted medical abortions to preserve the
mother's life: "Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion pro-
cured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother."26
Relying on Griswold v. Connecticut, the district court agreed with
the plaintiffs that the Texas statute "deprive[d] single women and
married couples of their right, secured by the Ninth Amendment,
to choose whether to have children."2 7 The court acknowledged the
existence of state interests that might justify abortion regulations,
but found the statute overbroad:
To be sure, the defendant has presented the Court with several compelling
justifications for state presence in the area of abortions. These include the
legitimate interests of the state in seeing to it that abortions are performed
by competent persons and in adequate surroundings. Concern over abortion
of the "quickened" fetus may well rank as another such interest. The diffi-
culty with the Texas Abortion Laws is that, even if they promote these in-
terests, they far outstrip these justifications in their impact by prohibiting
all abortions except those performed "for the purpose of saving the life of
the mother."28
As suggested by the court's reference to a possible state interest
in protecting a "quickened" fetus,2 9 nothing in the opinion pur-
ported to definitively resolve the question of how late in pregnancy
the right to abortion lasts. Since the statute applied regardless of
the stage of pregnancy, almost any right to abortion early in preg-
nancy, outside the confines of the "life of the mother" exception,
would make the statute substantially overbroad. 0
25 314 F. Supp. at 1219 n.2 (quoting Texas Penal Code art. 1191).
21 Id. (quoting Texas Penal Code art. 1196).
27 Id. at 1221 (relying on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
28 Id. at 1223.
29 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132 ("It is undisputed that at common law, abortion per-
formed before 'quickening'-the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero,
appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy-was not an
indictable offense.").
30 In addition to the Ninth Amendment ground, the court found the statute
unconstitutionally vague because of questions concerning the application of the
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The Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals from the district court
decision, bypassing the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.3' Since two positions on the Supreme Court were unfilled
at the time,3 2 the case was initially argued to a seven-Justice bench,
along with the companion case of Doe v. Bolton from Georgia. 33 Fol-
lowing confirmation of Justices Powell and Rehnquist, both cases
were scheduled for reargument before a nine-member Court. 34
The parties' briefs in Roe v. Wade made no effort to argue the
question of when in pregnancy the right to abortion should end.
According to the appellants, Texas could not demonstrate that its
statute promoted a compelling interest in protecting prenatal life,
but they did not discuss whether such a compelling interest might
arise at some stage.3 The appellee defended "the state's interest
in preventing the arbitrary and unjustified destruction of an unborn
child-a living human being in the very earliest stages of its devel-
opment."36 Thus, whereas the appellants had argued for a right to
abortion and against a state interest in protecting fetal life, the
appellee argued that the state interest in protecting fetal life existed
at conception and negated any right to abortion. Neither brief
addressed the question of, assuming a right to abortion at the out-
set of pregnancy, when in the process of gestation the state interest
in fetal life might supersede the woman's rights. Likewise, though
exception to save the mother's life. 314 F. Supp. at 1223. On the question of the
appropriate remedy, the district court declared the statute unconstitutional, but
refused the plaintiffs' request for an injunction. Id. at 1224.
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 122 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (order
deferring question of jurisdiction until hearing on the merits).
32 See GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 507 (resignation of Justices
Black and Harlan); id. at 522 (cases initially argued before seating of Justices Powell
and Rehnquist).
13 The Court rejected the appellees' request to postpone oral argument. Roe v.
Wade, 404 U.S. 981 (Dec. 7, 1971).
31 Roe v. Wade, 408 U.S. 919 (June 26, 1972). Justice Douglas dissented from the
decision to schedule the cases for reargument. Id.
31 Brief for Appellants in Roe v. Wade, 1971 WL 128054, at 118-24. See also
Supplemental Brief of the Appellants in Roe v. Wade, 1972 WL 126044, at 9-14
(expanding on argument that statute was not narrowly drawn to achieve com-
pelling interest).
11 Brief for Appellee in Roe v. Wade, 1971 WL 134281, at 55. For the most part,
appellee focused on conception, but a few sentences were also devoted to "differ-
entiation" or "implantation" as potentially significant events. See id. at 30.
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Justices asked questions in both the initial oral argument and the
reargument relating to whether a state might regulate to protect
fetal life after some point in pregnancy, the advocates declined to
offer any assistance in such a line-drawing exercise.17
In light of the posture of the litigation and the framing of the
issues by the parties, the Court needed to address two principal
points of law to resolve the substantive dispute concerning the con-
stitutionality of the Texas statute under the Due Process Clause.
First, the Court needed to determine whether the Constitution, as
interpreted in the light of privacy precedents, protects a fundamen-
tal right to terminate a pregnancy. If the answer was "no," the state
would presumably prevail. If the Court found a fundamental right
to terminate a pregnancy, it would then need to decide whether
Texas had a compelling governmental interest in protecting unborn
life from the outset of pregnancy onward?8 If Texas did have a com-
pelling interest in protecting newly-conceived human life, the
statute would presumably be upheld. 39 If the Court decided that
Texas did not have a compelling interest in protecting unborn life
from the point of conception, the statute would be unconstitution-
ally overbroad.
The Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade resolved both questions
against the state of Texas. With respect to the first issue, the Court
said:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it
is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reserva-
37 See GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 524-27 (describing first oral
argument); id. at 525 (Justices Stewart and White questioning Sarah Weddington);
id. at 526 (questioning of Jay Floyd); id. at 568-72 (describing second oral argu-
ment); id. at 569 (Chief Justice Burger questioning Sarah Weddington); id. at 570-
71 (Justice White questioning Sarah Weddington); id. at 571 (Justice White
questioning Margie Hames).
38 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the
Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'com-
pelling state interest,' and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to
express only the legitimate state interests at stake." (citations omitted)).
11 It is possible the Court could have found a compelling interest in protecting
fetal life from the point of conception, but nevertheless decided that the statute
needed to contain additional exceptions beyond the exception for the mother's
life.
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tion of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.40
With respect to the second issue-Texas' contention that "life be-
gins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy,"-the
Court responded "[w]e need not resolve the difficult question of
when life begins." 41 Noting "the wide divergence of thinking on this
most sensitive and difficult question," the Court said "we do not
agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the
rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake." 42
HYPOTHETICAL LINE-DRAWING IN THE ROE OPINION
Had Justice Ginsburg drafted the Roe opinion, she might have
stopped after concluding that the state lacked a compelling interest
in protecting newly-conceived human life.43 The Supreme Court in
Roe, however, went forward from that point. The Roe Court opined
at length about scenarios in which states would or would not have
compelling interests in the context of hypothetical statutes regulat-
ing abortion in ways Texas had not.
The Roe Court first addressed "the State's important and legiti-
mate interest in the health of the mother"-even though Texas had
not argued maternal health as a justification for its statute44-con-
cluding that "the 'compelling' point, in the light of present medical
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester."4 The
Court explained:
This is so because of the now-established medical fact, referred to above,
that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less
40 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
41 Id. at 159.
42 Id. at 160, 162.
41 Perhaps she would have mentioned the possibility of a compelling state
interest in protecting fetal life at some point after conception, the approach taken
by the three-judge district court. See Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1223 ("Concern over
abortion of the 'quickened' fetus may well rank as another [compelling state]
interest.").
44 The only state interest advanced to support the statute in the Brief for
Appellee was the interest in preserving human life. See Brief for Appellee in Roe V.
Wade, 1971 WL 134281, at 55 ("Whatever personal right of privacy a pregnant
woman may have with respect to the disposition and use of her body must be bal-
anced against the personal right of the unborn child to life.").
45 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point,
a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regula-
tion reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health.4
6
Applying this principle, the Court then purported to address the
permissibility of several sorts of health regulations that were not
part of the Texas statute under review:
Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to
the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the
licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be
performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some
other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility;
and the like.
47
This discussion of hypothetical abortion statutes was not necessary
to determine the validity of the challenged Texas statute, which in-
cluded an exemption for abortions conducted "by medical advice"
to save the mother's life,48 but did not address matters of qualifica-
tions, licensing or facilities.
It could be argued that Roe's discussion of health-related regula-
tions was necessary to resolve the companion Doe case, since the
Georgia statute included provisions arguably designed to protect
maternal health. Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe indicated that
the Roe and Doe opinions "are to be read together."49 In Doe, the
Court struck down provisions of the Georgia law requiring abortions
to be performed in an accredited hospital, 0 providing for review of
abortion decisions by a hospital abortion committee, sl and requir-
ing the concurrence of two doctors in addition to the attending
physician.5 2 But this answer takes us only so far as an explanation
for Roe's maternal health discussion. These provisions of the Geor-
46 Id. (reference omitted).
47 Id.
48 See supra text accompanying note 25.
49 Roe, 410 U.S. at 165; see also Doe, 410 U.S. at 189 ("Roe v. Wade, supra, sets
forth our conclusion that a pregnant woman does not have an absolute constitu-
tional right to an abortion on her demand. What is said there is applicable here
and need not be repeated.").
50 Doe, 410 U.S. at 193-95.
s1 Id. at 195-98.
52 Id. at 198-200. The Doe Court also invalidated a provision requiring that the
patient be a Georgia resident. Id. at 200.
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gia statute applied to all abortions, including those in the earliest
stages of pregnancy. They could have been struck down as over-
broad on the ground that maternal health was not a compelling
state interest that early in the process of gestation. To rule on these
provisions of the Georgia statute, the Court did not need to address
hypothetical questions about when in pregnancy health-related
regulations might be upheld or what form those regulations could
take.
After dealing with maternal health, the Roe Court next addressed
"the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life,"
opining that "the 'compelling' point is at viability .... If the State is
interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as
to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is neces-
sary to preserve the life or health of the mother."5 3 As with the dis-
cussion of maternal health regulations, this portion of the Roe
opinion would not seem necessary to resolve the case. While the
Court did purport to "measure" the Texas statute "against these
standards," its conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional
flowed from the fact that it "ma[de] no distinction between abor-
tions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later."5 4
The declaration that a state interest in protecting fetal life becomes
compelling at viability played no role in the analysis. The Texas
statute would have been unconstitutional no matter what line the
Court identified: eight weeks, first trimester, quickening, viability,
live birth. Any line drawn by the Court after conception would have
produced precisely the same result. It would seem, then, that Roe's
viability rule went "beyond the case," to apply the language from
Chief Justice John Marshall's classic description of dicta.55
THE ROE COURT'S AWARENESS THAT IT
WAS CREATING DICTA
The Webster plurality's reading of the holding in Roe presumably
rested on reasoning like that above, indicating that Roe's trimester
framework played no genuine role in the invalidation of the Texas
s1 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
14 Id. at 164.
ss Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 399-400 (1821).
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statute. Not everyone has agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist, how-
ever, that Roe's holding extended no farther than the declaration
that Texas violated a due process right to abortion. The Casey plu-
rality suggested that at least the viability rule should be treated as
part of Roe's holding, and some academic commentary has cri-
tiqued the understanding of the holding/dicta distinction suppos-
edly reflected in Chief Justice Rehnquist's Webster opinion.16
Do the Roe Court's internal deliberations tell us anything relevant
to this controversy surrounding the holding of the case? Signifi-
cantly, the available papers of Justices who joined the Roe opinion
suggest that they viewed the holding versus dicta question in much
the same way as Rehnquist. Those papers clearly reveal the recog-
nition of Justices in the Roe majority that they did not need to resolve
the question of the duration of abortion rights, and that portions
of the opinion addressing that question represented dicta.
The first oral argument in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton took
place in December 1971.11 Following the initial conference discus-
sion and Chief Justice Burger's assignment of the opinions to Justice
Blackmun, Justice Douglas sent Justice Brennan a draft of an opinion
in Doe with a cover letter indicating that society has a "rightful con-
cern" with "the life of the fetus after quickening." 58 Justice Brennan
responded with a memorandum recording his thoughts about the
abortion cases, sent only to Justice Douglas, as they waited to see
what Justice Blackmun would write. Justice Brennan indicated that
he would rather defer the question of the duration of abortion
rights until a later case:
[A]lthough I would, of course, find a compelling State interest in requiring
abortions to be performed by doctors, I would deny any such interest in the
life of the fetus in the early stages of pregnancy. On the other hand, I would
leave open the question when life "is actually present"-whether there is
56 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; Dorf, supra note 12, at 2032-33. I am not per-
suaded by Professor Dorf's suggestion that Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored the
rationale of Roe. Such a criticism would be valid if he had re-conceptualized Roe's
outcome based on some other constitutional theory, for instance, by recasting it
as a case about vagueness. However, the Webster plurality acknowledged that Roe
invalidated the Texas statute based on a substantive due process right to abortion.
492 U.S. at 521 (Roe held "that the Texas statute unconstitutionally infringed the
right to an abortion derived from the Due Process Clause").
17 See GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 523.
"I Id. at 534.
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some point in the term before birth at which the interest in the life of the
fetus does become subordinating. 9
Justice Brennan did not use the word "dictum," but he clearly rec-
ognized that the pending cases did not require the Court to express
an opinion as to when in pregnancy a compelling state interest in
protecting fetal life might arise.
Justice Blackmun circulated a May 1972 draft opinion in Roe v.
Wade, which would have struck down the Texas statute on vague-
ness grounds. 60 That draft was followed a week later by a draft
opinion in Doe v. Bolton, which would have invalidated various pro-
visions of the Georgia abortion statute as violating constitutional
privacy rights.61 The Doe draft acknowledged that the presence of
the fetus could qualify the woman's right to an abortion at some
point in pregnancy, but did not purport to resolve how far into preg-
nancy the right extended:
The heart of the matter is that somewhere, either forthwith at concep-
tion, or at "quickening," or at birth, or at some other point in between,
another being becomes involved and the privacy the woman possessed has
become dual rather than sole. The woman's right of privacy must be meas-
ured accordingly. It is not for us of the judiciary, especially at this point in
the development of man's knowledge, to speculate or to specify when life
begins. On this question there is no consensus even among those trained
in the respective disciplines of medicine, or philosophy, or theology.
In related contexts we have rejected the claim that an individual has an
unlimited right to do as he pleases with his body. See, for example, Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination), and Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (compulsory sterilization). Except to note that the
State's interest 62 grows stronger as the woman approaches term, we need
not delineate that interest with greater detail in order to recognize it is a
s9 Justice William J. Brennan, Memorandum re: Abortion Cases, at 9 (Dec. 30,
1971) (emphasis added), in William J. Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Man-
uscript Division, Box 1:285, Folder 9; GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supro note 18, at
537.
6) See Roe v. Wade, 1st Draft (May 18, 1972), in Harry A. Blackmun Papers,
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 151, Folder 4 [hereinafter Blackmun
Papers].
61 See Doe v. Bolton, 1st Draft (May 25, 1972), in Blackmun Papers, supra note
60, Box 152, Folder 7.
62 One version of this draft opinion includes here the handwritten emendation
"perhaps." Id. at 10-11. I have no information as to whether all copies of this draft
included that change.
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"compelling" state interest. As such, it may constitutionally be asserted
when the State does so with appropriate regard for fundamental individual
rights. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940). The woman's per-
sonal right, therefore, is not unlimited. It must be balanced against the
State's interest.6
3
The draft opinion evaluated the challenged provisions of the
Georgia law and found them unduly restrictive of abortion rights in
light of the state interests asserted.6 4 Justices Douglas, Brennan and
Marshall joined the opinion the day it circulated, while recommend-
ing some improvements, and Justice Stewart joined a few days
later, after Blackmun agreed to changes.65 At that stage, five out of
the seven Justices who participated in oral argument supported
Blackmun's first draft of the Doe opinion, which recognized a right
to abortion, but did not address the duration of that right.66
Even though he had a clear majority, Justice Blackmun soon sug-
gested that both Roe and Doe be reargued the following term to a
nine-Justice Court.67 His memorandum raised a number of ques-
tions that the Court might still want to address, including:
Should we spell out-although it would then necessarily be largely dictum-
just what aspects are controllable by the State and to what extent? For
example, it has been suggested that upholding Georgia's provision as to
a licensed hospital should be held unconstitutional, and the Court should
approve performance of an abortion in a "licensed medical facility."6
Justice Blackmun did not deal explicitly with the duration of abor-
tion rights in this passage, but he recognized that an opinion
addressing "what aspects are controllable by the State and to what
extent" would consist "largely" of dictum. Justice Douglas vigor-
ously, but unsuccessfully resisted the idea of reargument, telling
Justice Blackmun "you have a firm 5 and the firm 5 will be behind
you in these two opinions until they come down."6 9
63 See id. at 10-11.
64 See id. at 13-19.
65 See GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 551-52.
66 Id. at 552.
67 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum to the Conference Re: No. 70-18-
Roe v. Wade, No. 70-40-Doe v. Bolton (May 31, 1972), in Blackmun Papers, supra
note 60, Box 151, Folder 3.
66 Id. at 2 (emphasis added); GARROw, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 552-53.
69 GARROw, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 553.
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Over the summer, Justice Blackmun researched medical aspects
of abortion at the Mayo Clinic while a law clerk worked on possible
revisions to the draft opinions in Roe and Doe.70 At the end of the
summer, the clerk wrote Justice Blackmun a memorandum explain-
ing his proposed changes to the opinions.71 He recommended con-
tinuing with the plan to resolve Roe on vagueness grounds and Doe
based on substantive due process:
Especially if you draw a line to the force of the privacy right in mid-preg-
nancy, as I have done in my revised draft [in Doe], the vagueness ground in
the Texas case is an important complementary holding to that of the Georgia
case, and will be necessary for a complete exposition of what the Court
thinks would and would not be constitutional in this whole area.72
As part of the effort to generate a "complete exposition" of the
constitutionality of statutes "in this whole area," the clerk indicated
that he had revised the Doe draft to provide that abortion rights
would continue until fetal viability:
I have written in, essentially, a limitation of the right depending on the time
during pregnancy when the abortion is proposed to be performed. I have
chosen the point of viability for this "turning point" (when state interests
become compelling) for several reasons:
(a) it seems to be the line of most significance to the medical profession,
for various purposes;
(b) it has considerable analytic basis in terms of the state interest as I have
articulated it. The alternative, quickening, no longer seems to have much
analytic or medical significance, only historical significance[;]
(c) a number of state laws which have a "time cut-off" after which abortion
must be more strongly justified by life or health interests use 24 weeks,
which is about the "earliest" time of viability.73
Justice Blackmun did not immediately embrace the clerk's sug-
gestion of making viability the controlling line but, as we shall see,
he soon selected a different stage of pregnancy as the terminal
point for abortion rights.
70 Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, supra note 18, at 29.
71 Memorandum from George [Freeman] to Mr. Justice [Blackmun] (August 11,
1972), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 60, Box 152, Folder 5.
72 Id. at 1.
71 Id. at 1-2.
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All nine Justices met for a conference following reargument of
Roe and Doe in October 1972. Justice Blackmun indicated that he
remained "where [he] was last spring," and planned to continue
with the initial approach of resolving Roe on vagueness and Doe on
substantive due process grounds.14 Justice Powell, however, sug-
gested making Roe the lead case and deciding it based on a consti-
tutional right to abortion."5 Perhaps eager to win the vote of one
of the Court's two new members, Justice Blackmun embraced the
recommendation to abandon the vagueness rationale in Roe and
decide both cases on a substantive due process theory.76
Justice Blackmun circulated his second draft of Roe in late Novem-
ber.77 Consistent with Justice Powell's recommendation at confer-
ence, the discussion of a constitutional right to abortion that
appeared in the first draft of Doe had now shifted to the opinion in
Roe.78 For the first time in a circulated draft, the opinion also
addressed the issue of the duration of abortion rights:
We repeat that the State does have an important and legitimate interest in
the potentiality of human life and that this interest grows in strength as the
woman approaches term. At some point this interest becomes "com-
pelling." We fix that point at, or at any time after, the end of the first
trimester, as the State may determine.
79
A cover memorandum accompanying the opinion explained this
change:
Herewith is a memorandum (1972 fall edition) on the Texas abortion case.
This has proved for me to be both difficult and elusive. In its present form
it contains dictum, but / suspect that in this area some dictum is indicated
and not to be avoided.
You will observe that I have concluded that the end of the first trimester
is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other selected point, such as
quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary. 0
74 GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 574-75.
75 Id. at 575.
76 Id. at 576.
77 See Roe v. Wade, 2nd Draft (Nov. 22, 1972), in Blackmun Papers, supra note
60, Box 151, Folder 6.
"I See id. at 48.
79 Id. at 47.
80 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum to the Conference Re: No. 70-18-
Roe v. Wade (Nov. 21, 1972) (emphasis added), in Blackmun Papers, supra note
60, Box 151, Folder 6; GARRoW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 580.
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Justice Blackmun's confession that the opinion contained "dic-
tum," followed by his discussion of the "arbitrary" cutoff date,
strongly implied that the dicta included the portion of the draft
opinion indicating that the state has a compelling interest in poten-
tial human life after the first trimester. This understanding of the
line between holding and dictum is consistent with Chief Justice
Rehnquist's reading of Roe's holding in Webster. Interestingly, the
sentence from the final Roe opinion describing the trimester frame-
work as a "holding" already appears in this draft, applied to the first-
trimester line drawn by Justice Blackmun." That the draft opinion
applies the word "holding" to what Justice Blackmun's internal
cover memorandum labels "dictum" supports the idea that Roe
here used "holding" in an informal, non-technical sense.82
Professor Garrow describes a memorandum to Justice Powell
from one of his law clerks commenting on Blackmun's second draft
of Roe. On the issue of the duration of abortion rights, the clerk
wrote:
Since the statutory prohibition [in Texas] was total, it is unnecessary to the
result that we draw the line. If a line ultimately must be drawn, it seems
that "viability" provides a better point. This is where Judge Newman would
have drawn the line.83
Like the private memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Dou-
glas and the circulated cover memorandum accompanying Black-
mun's draft, Justice Powell's clerk acknowledged that the Court
could resolve the Texas case without "draw[ing] a line," i.e., that any
such line drawing would constitute dicta. The clerk's reference to
Judge Newman relates to an opinion in a Connecticut abortion case,
Abele v. Markle, which Justice Powell had previously called to the
clerk's attention. 84
Following receipt of his law clerk's analysis, Justice Powell wrote
privately to Justice Blackmun to inquire "whether you view your
81 Compare Roe v. Wade, 2nd Draft, supra note 77, at 49, with Roe, 410 U.S. at
165-66. See supra text accompanying note 11.
82 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
8 Garrow, Revelations on the Road to Roe, supra note 18, at 82.
14 Id. (referring to Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated,
410 U.S. 951 (1973)).
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choice of 'the first trimester' as essential to your decision.""5 Powell
expressed a preference for viability as a possible line:
I have wondered whether drawing the line at "viability"-if we conclude to
designate a particular point of time-would not be more defensible in logic
and biologically than perhaps any other single time. I have reread Judge
Newman's opinion in Abele v. Markel [sic] (concurred in by Ed Lumbard). In
addressing this issue, he says:
". . the state interest in protecting the life of a fetus capable of living
outside the uterus could be shown to be more generally accepted and,
therefore, of more weight in the constitutional sense than the interest
in preventing the abortion of a fetus that is not viable. The issue might
well turn on whether the time period selected could be shown to per-
mit survival of the fetus in a generally accepted sense, rather than for
the brief span of hours and under the abnormal conditions illustrated
by some of the state's evidence. As to the latter situation, the nature
of the state's interest might well not be generally accepted. Finally, and
most important, such a statute would not be a direct abridgement of
the woman's constitutional right, but at most a limitation on the time
when her right could be exercised."
I rather agree with the view that the interest of the state is clearly identifi-
able, in a manner which would be generally understood, when the fetus be-
comes viable. At any point in time prior thereto, it is more difficult to justify
a cutoff date.
Of course, it is not essential that we express an opinion as to such a date.
Judge Newman did not do this explicitly. In holding the Connecticut statute
unconstitutional, he pointed the way generally toward "viability" without
making this an explicit ruling.86
Justice Powell's memorandum to Justice Blackmun thus indicated
that any cutoff line identified for abortion rights would not affect
his vote and, as his law clerk had argued, that the Court did not
need to "express an opinion as to such a date."8 7 He clearly viewed
any cutoff period as dicta, in other words, and not particularly crit-
ical dicta at that.88
1s Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Memorandum re: Abortion Cases (Nov. 29, 1972),
in Blackmun Papers, supra note 60, Box 151, Folder 8; Garrow, Revelations on the
Road to Roe, supra note 18, at 83.
86 Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Memorandum re: Abortion Cases, supra note 85,
at 1-2 (emphasis added).
87 Id. at 2.
88 He also recognized that Judge Newman's opinion, from which he drew his in-
spiration, had addressed this issue only in dicta. Id.
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Justice Blackmun's private response to Justice Powell indicated
that he had "no particular commitment to the point marking the
end of the first trimester as contrasted with some other point, such
as quickening or viability."89 He "could go along with viability if it
could command a court," noting that "[b]y that time the state's
interest has grown large indeed."90 A week later, Justice Blackmun
circulated a memorandum soliciting the views of the full Court as
to whether viability would be a better choice than the first trimester:
I selected the earlier point because I felt that it would be more easily ac-
cepted (by us as well as others) and because most medical statistics and sta-
tistical studies appear to me to be centered there, Viability, however, has
its own strong points. It has logical and biological justifications. There is a prac-
tical aspect, too, for I am sure that there are many pregnant women, par-
ticularly younger girls, who may refuse to face the fact of pregnancy and
who, for one reason or another, do not get around to medical consultation
until the end of the first trimester is upon them or, indeed, has passed.
I suspect that few could argue, or would argue, that a state's interest by the
time of viability, when independent life is presumably possible, is not suffi-
ciently developed to justify appropriate regulation. What we are talking
about, therefore, is the interval from approximately 12 weeks to about 28
weeks.
One argument for the earlier date is that the state may well be concerned
about facilities and such things as the need of hospitalization from and after
the first trimester. If the point of viability is selected, a decision of this kind
is necessarily left to the attending physician.
I might add that some of the district courts that have been confronted with
the abortion issue have spoken in general, but not specific, terms of viability.
See, for example, Judge Newman's observation in the last Abele v. Markle
decision.91
Justice Blackmun's memorandum to the Conference echoed
themes from Justice Powell's private communication, including the
81 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum re: Abortion Cases, at 1 (Dec. 4,
1972), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 60, Box 151, Folder 4; Garrow, Revelations
on the Rood to Roe, supra note 18, at 83.
10 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum re: Abortion Cases, supra note 89,
at 1.
91 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum to the Conference Re: Abortion
Cases, at 1-2 (Dec. 11, 1972), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 60, Box 151, Folder
4; GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 582-83.
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unelaborated reference to "logical" and "biological" justifications
for the viability rule, language that eventually worked its way into
the Roe opinion. 92
Reactions to Justice Blackmun's inquiry varied. Justice Powell sent
a handwritten note: "Harry-I will join your present opinion and so
I leave entirely to you whether to address the 'viability' issue. It
does seem to me that viability is a more logical & supportable time,
but this is not a critical issue with me." 93 Justice Douglas, by contrast,
wrote, "I favor the first trimester, rather than viability."94 Justice
Marshall foreshadowed the approach eventually taken under Roe's
trimester framework. He thought the state interest in "ensuring that
abortions be done under safe conditions" could be accommodated
if, "between the end of the first trimester and viability," the opinion
permitted regulations "directed at health and safety alone."95 But
he would be "disturbed" if some point before viability was set as
the time when "the State's interest in preserving the potential life
of the unborn child overrides any individual interests of the woman."96
One of Justice Blackmun's clerks had already made basically the
same suggestion, recommending that states be able to regulate
abortion for health reasons after the first trimester and to protect
fetal life after viability.97 Justice Brennan likewise advocated differ-
ent cutoff points based on the distinct state interests involved:
For example, rather than using a somewhat arbitrary point such as the end
of the first trimester or a somewhat imprecise and technically inconsistent
point such as "viability," could we not simply say that at that point in time
where abortions become medically more complex, state regulation-rea-
sonably calculated to protect the asserted state interests of safeguarding
the health of the woman and of maintaining medical standards- becomes
permissible. By way of discussion, we might then explain that this point
92 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 ("State regulation protective of fetal life after viability
thus has both logical and biological justifications.").
93 Note from L.F.P. (Dec. 12, 1972), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 60, Box 151,
Folder 8.
94 Justice William 0. Douglas, Memorandum re: Abortion Cases (Dec. 11, 1972),
in Blackmun Papers, supra note 60, Box 151, Folder 3.
11 Justice Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum re: Abortion Cases (Dec. 12, 1972),
in Blackmun Papers, supra note 60, Box 151, Folder 4; see GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEX-
UALITY, supra note 18, at 583-84.
9' Justice Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum re: Abortion Cases, supra note 95.
9 See David J. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, supra note 18, at 29-30.
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usually occurs somewhere between 16 and 24 weeks (or whatever the case
may be), but the exact "cut-off" point and the specifics of the narrow regu-
lation itself are determinations that must be made by a medically informed
state legislature. Then we might go on to say that at some later stage of
pregnancy (i.e., after the fetus becomes "viable") the state may well
have an interest in protecting the potential life of the child and therefore a
different and possibly broader scheme of state regulation would become
permissible.98
As with Justice Marshall, we see Justice Brennan identifying distinct
state interests-maternal health and medical standards on the one
hand, and "potential life" on the other-and advocating different
cutoff dates depending on the interest involved.
Of particular relevance for distinguishing holding and dicta in
the Roe opinion is Justice Stewart's response to Justice Blackmun's
inquiry:
One of my concerns with your opinion as presently written is the specificity
of its dictum- particularly in its fixing of the end of the first trimester as the
critical point for valid state action. I appreciate the inevitability and indeed
wisdom of dicta in the Court's opinion, but I wonder about the desirability
of the dicta being quite so inflexibly "legislative."9
Justice Stewart clearly described the opinion's discussion of when
states could regulate abortion as "dicta," and criticized that dicta as
"legislative" in character due to its rule-like specificity. He instead
wanted "to allow the States more latitude to make policy judgments
between the two alternatives mentioned in your memorandum,
and perhaps others." 100
Justice Blackmun's third draft of the Roe opinion was the first to
include the trimester framework.' States could regulate abortion
procedures to promote the health of the mother after the first
trimester.102 After viability, the state could proscribe abortion to
18 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Memorandum re: Abortion Cases, at 2-3 (Dec.
13, 1972), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 60, Box 151, Folder 8; see GARROW, LIBERTY
AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 584-85.
99 Justice Potter Stewart, Memorandum re: Abortion Cases (Dec. 14, 1972), in
Blackmun Papers, supra note 60, Box 151, Folder 8; see GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUAUTY,
supra note 18, at 585.
10 Justice Potter Stewart, Memorandum re: Abortion Cases, supra note 98.
111 See Roe v. Wade, 3rd Draft (Dec. 21, 1972), in Blackmun Papers, supra note
60, Box 151, Folder 6.
102 Id. at 49.
HeinOnline  -- 51 Am. J. Legal Hist. 525 2011
promote its interest in "the potentiality of human life," except
where necessary for the mother's life or health.103 In the cover
memorandum accompanying the third draft, Justice Blackmun
acknowledged his debt to Justices Brennan and Marshall: "I have
tried to follow the lines suggested by Bill Brennan and Thurgood."10 4
WHY INCLUDE DICTA ON THE DURATION
OF ABORTION RIGHTS?
Our review of the Roe Court's internal correspondence shows
that the Justices knew they were creating dicta when they pur-
ported to draw lines governing the duration of abortion rights. Jus-
tices Brennan and Powell both indicated that the Court did not need
to draw a line specifying when a state's interest in fetal life would
supersede a woman's right to abortion. Justices Blackmun and Stewart
both applied the label "dictum" or "dicta" to the initial attempt at
such line-drawing in Roe's second draft. Moreover, a five-Justice
majority of the Court signed onto the initial circulation in Doe, which
would have established a right to abortion without opining on any
specific temporal limitations. The majority's understanding of the
trimester framework as dicta may also help explain the mystery of
Justice Douglas joining the majority opinion, but then authoring a
concurrence that referred to the "rightful concern of society" with
"the life of the fetus after quickening."' 10 In the majority's internal
deliberations, Justice Douglas had opposed setting viability as the
cutoff point for abortion rights,10 6 and his concurrence may suggest
that he thought the controlling line remained open for discussion.
So why would the Court address the duration of abortion rights,
albeit in dicta, when it knew the issue was not really raised by the
cases before it? One strong possibility suggested by the Roe and
Doe papers is that Justice Blackmun wanted to provide guidance
103 A
104 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum to the Conference re: Abortion
Cases (Dec. 21, 1972), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 60, Box 151, Folder 6; see
GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supro note 18, at 585-86.
105 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
106 See supra text accompanying note 94.
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to legislators who would be revising state abortion laws after the
decision came down. Justice Blackmun was aware that striking
down the Texas statute would invalidate the majority of state abor-
tion statutes. 0 7 He had suggested to the Court that the Roe and Doe
opinions should be released "no later than the week of January 15
to tie in with the convening of most state legislatures," 1°8 a target
the Court missed by only a week. The manuscript Justice Blackmun
prepared to read in announcing the opinions focused on the ongo-
ing legislative process:
Fortunately, the decisions come down at a time when a majority of the leg-
islatures of the states are in session. Presumably where these decisions cast
doubt as to the constitutional validity of a state's abortion statute, the leg-
islature of that state may immediately review its statute and amend it to
bring it into line with the constitutional requirements we have endeavored
to spell out today. If this is done, there is no need whatsoever for any pro-
longed period of unregulated abortion practice.0 9
Whatever its shortcomings, the trimester framework at least laid
out a road map to show state legislators how they could reduce the
risk that revised abortion legislation would face a constitutional
challenge.
Beyond a desire to guide state legislators, Justice Blackmun may
have had a more personal motive for deciding "just what aspects
are controllable by the State and to what extent," as he put it in his
memorandum calling for reargument or, in the words of his law
clerk, providing "a complete exposition of what the Court thinks
would and would not be constitutional in this whole area." 10 Justice
Blackmun clearly did not relish the reaction his opinions would
elicit. A few days after the decisions came down, he gave a public
address, commenting that "[n]o matter how the Court ruled, it will
be excoriated from one end of the country to the other." He re-
vealed that he "really resent[ed] that [the abortion issue] had to
107 GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 550 ("1 should observe that,
according to the information contained in some of the briefs, knocking out the
Texas statute in Roe v. Wode will invalidate the abortion laws in a majority of our
States. Most States focus only on the preservation of the life of the mother.").
108 See id. at 585.
109 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, No. 70-18-Roe v. Wade; No. 70-40-Doe v.
Bolton, at 7, in Blackmun Papers, supra note 60, Box 151, Folder 3.
"I See supro notes 68 & 72 and accompanying text.
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come before the Court because it is a medical and moral prob-
lem." 1 ' By dealing with most of the significant questions at one
time, perhaps Justice Blackmun hoped to reduce the need for the
Court to entertain further abortion cases in the future. When Chief
Justice Burger raised the issue of the rights of fathers, Justice Black-
mun relegated the question to a noncommittal footnote," 2 telling
the Court he was "somewhat reluctant to try to cover the point in
cases where the father's rights, if any, are not at issue." 1 3 But in
light of Justice Blackmun's distaste for deciding abortion cases, one
detects a note of lament when he adds, "I suspect there will be
other aspects of abortion that will have to be dealt with at a future
time."
WHAT IF THE COURT HAD WAITED?
Justice Ginsburg's comments on Roe invite us to consider what
might have happened if the Court had not aspired to furnish such a
"complete exposition" of the constitutional law of abortion. What
if the Court had not announced the now-abandoned trimester
framework-or its surviving component, the viability rule-as part
of the initial Roe opinion? What if the Court had remained silent as
to the duration of abortion rights, waiting to address the question
in a case where it had to be faced?
If the Court had held out for a case in which counsel had a reason
to litigate the line-drawing question, it presumably would have
enjoyed the benefit of comprehensive briefing and argument and
a factual record prepared to assist in its determination. Professor
John Hart Ely criticized Roe's identification of viability as the con-
trolling line for the state interest in fetal life, contending that "the
Court's defense seem[ed] to mistake a definition for a syllogism."1 4
The Roe opinion, in other words, did not adequately justify the viability
rule in constitutional terms."' Might the Court have chosen a dif-
ferent line for the duration of abortion rights, or offered a better
'1' GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 607.
112 Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 n.67.
113 GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 18, at 586.
114.John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 924 (1973).
115 Beck, supra note 1, at 268-69.
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defense of the line it chose, if it had acted in a case where the answer
really mattered, in light of a complete record and on the basis of
plenary briefing and argument?
The selection of viability as the threshold for state protection of
fetal life produces odd consequences that seem difficult to explain
in principled terms. Since the point of viability shifts over time in
response to medical advances, the viability rule causes fetal and
maternal rights to vary based on the existing state of obstetric
medicine or the proximity of the mother to cutting edge medical
facilities.116 Since viability is less an objective line than a somewhat
subjective prediction informed by objective indicators, the rule sub-
jects fetal and maternal rights to the skill and treatment philosophy
of a particular doctor, who may have personal or ideological inter-
ests at stake in the viability determination.11' Moreover, given that
prospects for survival depend on the race and sex of the fetus, a
focus on viability introduces racial and gender disparities into con-
stitutional law. One consequence of the viability rule, for instance,
is that the right to abortion lasts longer, on average, for Caucasian
women than for similarly-situated African-American women.1 18
Would the Court have been so convinced of the "logical and biolog-
ical justifications" for the viability rule if counsel had brought such
problems to its attention? 19 Or what if the briefing had provided
an international perspective demonstrating that drawing
the line at viability would result in an abortion regime offering less
protection for fetal life than most other countries in the world? 2 °
Such questions make for interesting speculation and perhaps pro-
vide lessons for courts in future cases. People will no doubt draw
disparate conclusions concerning the wisdom of the dicta underly-
ing the Roe Court's trimester framework. But that the opinion did
in fact make extensive use of dicta seems less in doubt, at least
when viewed from the perspective of the Justices who participated
in the decision.
116 Id. at 258-59.
117 Id. at 260.
118 Id. at 260-61.
119 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
120 Beck, supro note 1, at 262.
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